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Abstract

Sweeping change is necessary at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During President Barack Obama‘s
transition into office, change should go deeper than usual between administrations. To restore the trust of the
American people and to regain the confidence of the international community, the CIA needs to do better. I
will outline three areas for legislative change relating to my former employer, the CIA. The first proposal is to
have a national security court for the trials of terrorists. The second is to permit the CIA to continue to have an
exception to pursue aggressive interrogations with a lot of oversight and checks. The third is to continue the
process of rendition or the transfer of suspected terrorists with more oversight and checks.
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CHANGE VERSUS CONTINUITY AT OBAMA'S CIAt
A. John Radsan*
Sweeping change is necessary at the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA"). During President Barack Obama's transition into office, change
should go deeper than usual between administrations. To restore the
trust of the American people and to regain the confidence of the
international community, the CIA needs to do better.
These comments might make me sound like a reformer, and you
may wonder if I am a Democrat or a Republican. It does not matter,
because this applies across the parties. Deeper change is necessary
within the CIA offices of the Director, General Counsel, and Inspector
General. The CIA has failed the American people and created a
perception that security has come at the expense of fundamental rights.
As a justice of the Supreme Court of Israel said, "Sometimes, a
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back."1 That is what
makes the United States better than the people it is up against.
I will outline three areas for legislative change relating to my
former employer, the CIA. The first proposal is to have a national
security court for the trials of terrorists. The second is to permit the CIA
to continue to have an exception to pursue aggressive interrogations
with a lot of oversight and checks. The third is to continue the process of
rendition or the transfer of suspected terrorists with more oversight and
checks.

I. PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT
The first proposal is the creation of a national security court to deal
with the trials of suspected terrorists. By a national security court, I
mean something different from the criminal justice system-the Article

t This Essay is adapted for publication from a panel discussion presented as part of
the Regent University Law Review and The Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy
Studies National Security Symposium at Regent University School of Law, September 27,
2008. The panel discussed recent legislation affecting national security. Speakers included:
Admiral Vern Clark (ret.), Chief of U.S. Naval Operations; Professor A. John Radsan,
William Mitchell College of Law; and Professor Gregory S. McNeal, Penn State Dickinson
School of Law. The panel was moderated by Professor Robert W. Ash, Regent University
School of Law.
*
Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Mr. Radsan was
Assistant General Counsel at the CIA from 2002-2004.
1 Aharon Barak, President (Chief Justice), Supreme Court of Isr., Keynote Address
to the Brandeis Univ. Class of 2003 (May 18, 2003), http://my.brandeis.edu/
news/item?news_item id=101585 (discussing the importance of law and individual rights
even while fighting a war).
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III courts that were used in prosecuting Zacarias Moussaoui, 2 Jose
Padilla,3 and the people involved in the first attack on the World Trade
Center.4 We need something different. I will not go into detail, but I
would like to claim some ownership here. There is much writing in this
area, and I am part of the group that says terrorism cases cannot all be
handled through the criminal courts. I am not necessarily in favor of
Guantanamo Bay. I am not in favor of court martial under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") for suspected terrorists. 5 Instead, we
need a national security court that blends what works in the criminal
justice system with adjustments that take into consideration this new
threat.
I differ from the Bush Administration because I think it was a
profound mistake to try to create a new type of court by executive order
based solely on the President's prerogative. 6 Instead, Congress should
sort out the intricacies through congressional hearings and then pass a
statute for special trials that protect the intelligence community's
sources and methods. I am spreading the blame, but it is fair to say that
Congress has let the United States down. Congress has not done enough
to think through these difficult issues-in the seven years since
September 11, 2001, there is still no consensus on what the legal
7
framework is going to be for dealing with terrorism cases.
During the last presidential campaign, the media let the American
people down. I understand the importance of energy security and
economic security-these are also important issues-but the media
would have served the American people well by simply asking the
candidates whether they were for a national security court.
The idea of a national security court is fashionable now. It has some
8
proponents, including one who formerly wrote for The Washington Post,
and other professors. 9 Commander Glenn Sulmasy was probably one of
See United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 223 & n.1, 224 (4th Cir. 2007).
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004). Padilla was first held in the
criminal justice system, transferred to military custody, and then transferred back to the
criminal justice system for trial in Miami, Florida.
4
See United States v. Salameh, 856 F. Supp. 781, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (listing
individuals convicted for World Trade Center bombing).
5
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2006).
6
See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terror § 4, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834-35 (Nov. 13, 2001).
7
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240-42, 2277 (2008) (discussing the
varied attempts the U.S. government has undertaken to bring detainees to justice and
concluding that "the law .... is a matter yet to be determined" for detainee cases).
8 Workable Terrorism Trials: A Special Federal Court Could Balance Fundamental
Rights and National Security Needs, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B6.
9 Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists'Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2007, at A19.
2
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the first to publicly advocate for a national security court. 10 I also wrote
on the topic at length in the National Law Journal" and Temple Law
Review. 12 I have consistently supported the idea of a national security
court.
The national security court should be modeled after something like
the FISA Court to review who goes into the program and to ensure
compliance with the rules. 13 The Inspector General of the CIA, the
General Counsel of the CIA, and the oversight committees should not be
blindly trusted to monitor secret proceedings. Instead, another branch of
government or its representative should monitor this program.
II.

INTERROGATION REFORM FOR THE

CIA

The second area I propose for legislative change is a special set of
rules for the CIA. Should the CIA use interrogation tactics that differ
from what Federal Bureau of Investigation agents can use in the
criminal justice system or from the rules that investigators for the
Department of Defense can use under the Army Field Manual? The CIA
should be able to use different tactics, I say, subject to some checks and
controls in the proposed legislation.
To review the current legal markers of what covers interrogation,
you may refer to the U.S. Constitution. But you can also look at the
Military Commissions Act 14 ('MCA"). Congress passed the MCA in
response to the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, which held that the
President's military commissions in Guantanamo were illegal because
they did not comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
as incorporated through the UCMJ. 15 The MCA amended the War
Crimes Act, permitting the President discretion to decide what tactics
would be consistent with Common Article 3.16 As a result, President
Bush issued a secret executive order. 17 The Bush Administration
operated in an intermediate zone of tactics beyond what the criminal
Glenn Sulmasy, Op-Ed., The National Security Court: A Natural Evolution,
May 10, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.eduforumy/2006/05/national-security-courtnatural.php.
11 A. John Radsan, Op-Ed., Unfinished Business, NAT'LL.J., July 24, 2006, at 30.
12 A. John Radsan, A Better Model for InterrogatingHigh-Level Terrorists,79 TEMP.
L. REV. 1227, 1233, 1244-46, 1288 (2006).
13 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000 &
Supp. III 2004). The FISA Court, also known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, was established to deal with matters of electronic surveillance. Id.
14 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
15 548 U.S. 557, 567, 635 (2006).
16 Military Commissions Act of 2006 sec. 6(a)-(b), 120 Stat. at 2632-35 (codified as
amended in 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006)).
17 See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26, 31.
10
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justice system would permit for a crime suspect, while insisting its
actions did not fall within the definition of torture.' 8 I agree with Elisa
Massimino that an interrogation tactic such as waterboarding is
torture; 19 but I think we disagree on what tactics we are willing to
permit the CIA to use, as matters of law and policy.
When I think about aggressive interrogation, I have Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed in mind. 20 When he was captured in March of 2003, in what
was thought to be a joint operation between Pakistani intelligence
agencies and the CIA,21 President Bush had to decide whether to allow
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed access to the criminal justice system and all
it entails. This would include access to a lawyer, an obligation to appear
before the nearest available magistrate, and the beginning of the
criminal process. Access to a lawyer would almost inevitably result in
advice not to talk to the government unless Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
received a plea agreement in exchange. It is unlikely, however, that
President Bush would have been able to plea bargain with Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed.
In 2003, Americans had a heightened sense of urgency-a sense of
fear that there may be more attacks on the United States. President
Bush made a decision that we needed to interrogate Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed more aggressively than is allowed by the criminal justice
system. 22 I am not supporting black sites. 23 I am not supporting
18 See Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State, Remarks Upon Her Departure for Europe at
Andrews Air Force Base (Dec. 5, 2005), http://2001-2009.state.govlsecretaryrm/2005
57602.htm.
19 Mark Benjamin, The CIA's Favorite Form of Torture, SALON.COM, June 7, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2O07/06/07/sensory-deprivation
(quoting
Elisa
Massimino during a discussion of "what worries human rights advocates" as stating,
"People finally came to an understanding of what waterboarding really was, and once that
happened, it was no longer sustainable"'). Waterboarding is "the technique of strapping a
subject to a board with his feet raised and pouring water on his face to produce a sensation
of imminent death." Id.
20 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a career terrorist and the mastermind of the 9/11
attacks. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 145-47 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
21 See Erik Eckholm, PakistanisArrest Qaeda Figure Seen as Plannerof 9/11, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at 1.
22 Bush
Admits to CIA Secret Prisons, BBC NEWS, Sept. 7, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm (noting President Bush's view that new
questioning has "helped us to take potential mass murderers off the streets before they
have a chance to kill").
23 Black sites were secret, overseas interrogation centers used predominately by the
CIA. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, ON THE RECORD: U.S. DISCLOSURES
ON RENDITION, SECRET DETENTION, AND COERCIVE INTERROGATION 11, 15-16 (2008)
(referring to black sites as CIA's "secret facilities," "secret prisons," and "covert prisons"),
available at http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/ontherecord.pdf.
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waterboarding. But I am carving out the possibility for more aggressive
interrogations on someone like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. As I have
previously stated, "As a society, we haven't figured out what the rough
rules are yet . . . . There are hardly any rules for illegal enemy
combatants. It's the law of the jungle. And right now we happen to be
24
the strongest animal."
What I propose, in order to find some common ground with my
opponents in the human rights community, is to incorporate more checks
on the CIA while allowing these enhanced tactics to be used on a limited
number of people considered to be high-value detainees. In contrast to
the view of the Bush Administration, I do not think the actual tactics
need to be classified. I understand that the "bad guys" may train against
tactics if we announce which techniques are permitted. But the "bad
guys" already have some sense of the interrogation techniques currently
used.25 Plus, any loss in the value of that intelligence is far outweighed
by the gain of transparency, which would help the American public and
the world buy into these interrogation efforts to defeat terrorism.
It is a principled debate, but if you believe that the government
should limit itself to the criminal justice system in trying terrorists, and
we have another attack-which sadly, I think we will-then I hope you
will not blame your politicians for not doing what they think should be
done to people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Their view of what
should be done, sadly, is informed by televisions programs like 24 rather
than helpful programs like this Symposium and the reading of deep,
knowledgeable materials about the very important tactics of how to
26
interrogate high-level terrorists.
Transparency is key. I would publish a list of available tactics. Then
there would be no guessing game where it is unclear which tactics are
permitted. Is sleep deprivation permitted? Sensory deprivation?
Bombarding with music? Imagine listening to Madonna-maybe that
would be fine for five or ten minutes. But what if Madonna is played for
twenty-four hours, and it is played loudly? These are serious questions
that need answers. I understand that these tactics cannot be considered
in isolation; it is necessary to talk about the cumulative effect-the long24 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary
Rendition"Program,NEWYORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 123.

25

Greg Jaffe & David S. Cloud, Investigators Cope with Curbs in Iraq on

Interrogation,WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2004, at A3.
26 Dahlia Lithwick, The Fiction Behind Torture Policy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 2008, at
11 C'Mhe star of Fox television's '24,' Jack Bauer.... has his fingerprints all over U.S.
interrogation policy.... Mhe lawyers designing interrogation techniques cited Bauer more
frequently than the Constitution.); Evan Thomas, '24' Versus the Real World, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/id/45788 (discussing the impact that the FOX
Network television show 24 has had on the views of Americans toward torture).
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term effect on both the person being interrogated and the interrogator.
But the law deals with difficult issues. This is one more difficult issue
that needs to be sorted out.
Strict limits should be put on the number of people that can be
subject to these interrogation tactics. Legislation should build in a low
number that binds the President for this special program. This number
could be classified, but the President could be required to designate in
advance those people who, if captured, the government would like to use
enhanced interrogation tactics against. I think most Americans would
agree that in February of 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed would have
been on that list.
Flowing from my idea of a national security court, I say defense
counsel should not be present during the beginning of the interrogation
process. Interrogators should have a one-on-one relationship with the
detainees who may have important information that could make us all
safer if disclosed. I understand, however, that putting an interrogator in
a room without an outside monitor from another agency creates the
possibility for abuse. Therefore, it would be sensible to borrow from other
systems and incorporate an ombudsman, who should have a security
clearance.27 The ombudsman would serve as another check to help keep
the process honest. Furthermore, videotaping the interrogations and
making sure the tapes are not destroyed create accountability. If people
destroy the tapes, they should be accountable for their crimes. This
proposal creates a limited exception for the CIA-an exception that
allows for necessary interrogation tactics. The government should not
authorize invasions of countries based on a tidbit of information that
comes out of the detainee's mouth without first comparing and
corroborating it with other sources of information. We do, however, want
to get the detainee talking.

III. EXTRAORDINARY AND IRREGULAR RENDITION
The third proposal centers around rendition. Extraordinary or
irregular rendition must continue. What is rendition? Rendition is the
transfer of individuals-in this case suspected terrorists-from one
jurisdiction outside the United States to another, 2 and may be used to
29
bring someone to trial or gather intelligence.
27 Other
governmental departments
have established ombudsmen. E.g.,
6 U.S.C. § 272 (2006) (creating ombudsman for the Department of Homeland Security);

Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 101, 110 Stat. 1452, 1455-56 (1996)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7811 (2006)) (changing title of "ombudsman" to
"taxpayer advocate" although responsibilities are quite similar).
28 BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1322 (8th ed. 2004) (defining rendition).
29 Ingrid Detter Frankopan, ExtraordinaryRendition and the Law of War, 33 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 657, 662 (2008).
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What is the alternative? The alternative is to do extradition, a
formal process that involves the courts and foreign ministries of the
countries involved. 30 Why is extradition not possible in all cases? The
United States does not have the cooperation of all countries. Why does
the United States need to use extraordinary or irregular rendition?
There are some "bad guys" and "bad gals" that the United States needs
to bring to justice or bring into a situation where information can be
gathered.
We are taught, because of the good reporting of Jane Mayer and
others, to sneer whenever we hear the word "rendition."31 If the sole
purpose of rendition is to transfer someone to another place to torture
him, then of course rendition is wrong-no reasonable person can be in
favor of that. Rendition for the purpose of torture is off limits. But if you
feel yourself being trained to say that rendition is horrible, think of all
the people who were held in Guantanamo. The human rights community
wants to release many of them, claiming that they are not a threat, that
there is no need to hold them, and that Guantanamo is a stain on our
reputation.3 2 The process by which they would be transferred to their
home countries or third countries is irregular rendition, as I define it. It
is not extradition.
Cases which involve the risk of torture or improper treatment by
the receiving country create a need to negotiate. Assurances of fair
treatment and proper monitoring reduce the risk of torture. Rendition
can work, and the United States needs the ability to transfer suspected
terrorists. The United States does not need to use rendition as
frequently as it has. We should not outsource to other countries-having
other countries interrogate our prisoners in a way that is more
aggressive than we ourselves permit. Instead, allowing for enhanced
interrogation techniques reduces the temptation to send detainees to
other countries with harsher interrogation tactics than U.S. law allows.
Again, my proposals seek to find a middle ground to tie a reformer's
thread with a conservative thread. I would involve the secret court to
monitor irregular rendition, and I have moved forward with this idea in

See id. at 659-61.
Mayer, supra note 24, at 107, 118 (equating the term "rendition" with various
forms of abuse); see also Reuel Marc Gerecht, Op-Ed., Out of Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2008, at 11 (equating "extraordinary rendition" with abuses).
32 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act and the Continued Use of Guantanamo Bay
as a Detention Facility: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 110th Cong. 11213, 116-18 (2007) (statement of Elisa Massimino, Washington Director, Human Rights
First).
30

31
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my writing. 33 We have had too many mistakes and too little
accountability in the current program. I respect the work of Elisa
Massimino and others who are saying that we need checks. 34 The human
rights community says rendition should be banned,3 5 but it should
consider the case of Adolf Eichmann who was brought to Israel for trial
for his war crimes by rendition from Argentina, although Israel did not
get Argentina's permission to do so. 36 Renditions, in special cases, make
sense.
I propose fewer renditions and much better oversight of them with a
secret court and a new regime at the CIA in the offices of the Inspector
General and the General Counsel. Rendition will continue and should
continue. It is not something that was invented by the Bush
Administration;
renditions were
also done in
the Clinton
Administration37 What has evolved-from what we can tell in the public
record-is that rendition occurs more now for interrogation rather than
to bring people to justice. And there have been more renditions after 9/11
38
than under the Clinton Administration.
For the CIA, there will be both change and continuity under
President Obama. A national security court is a big change that is
necessary. By contrast, aggressive interrogations and irregular
renditions are tactics that should continue with small changes through
new personnel and new controls.

33

See generally A. John Radsan, Irregular Rendition's Variation on a Theme by

Hamdi, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2008); A. John Radsan, A More Regular
Processfor IrregularRendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 54-56 (2006).
34 Elisa Massimino & Avidan Cover, While Congress Slept, HUM. RTS., Winter 2006,

at 5, 5, 8-10; Kenneth Roth, Why the Current Approach to Fighting Terrorism Is Making
Us Less Safe, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 592-93 (2008).
35 See AMNESTY INT'L, BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO TORTURE AND
'DISAPPEARANCE' 31 (2006), available at http:/www.amnesty.orglenllibrarylinfolAMR51/
051/2006 (recommending the ban of renditions unless certain procedures are followed).
36 James Paul Benoit, The Evolution of UniversalJurisdictionOver War Crimes, 53
NAVAL L. REV. 259, 273 (2006).
37 Frankopan, supra note 29, at 665.
38

Id.
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